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Abstract. Malware usually target computers according to their oper-
ating system. Thus we have Windows malwares, Linux malwares and
so on . . . In this paper, we consider a different approach and show on
a technical basis how easily malware can recognize and target systems
selectively, according to the onboard processor chip. This technology is
very easy to build since it does not rely on deep analysis of chip logical
gates architecture. Floating Point Arithmetic (FPA) looks promising to
define a set of tests to identify the processor or, more precisely, a subset
of possible processors. We give results for different families of processors:
AMD, Intel (Dual Core, Atom), Sparc, Digital Alpha, Cell, Atom . . . As
a conclusion, we propose two open problems that are new, to the authors’
knowledge.
1 Introduction
From the beginning of malware history (circa 1996), malware are:
– either operating system specific (Windows *.*, Unices, Mac, . . . );
– or application specific (e.g. macro viruses);
– or protocol dependent (e.g. Conficker versus Slammer).
We will use the following and large definition of a malware: it is a malicious code
like a virus, a worm, a spyware, a Trojan horse... whose aim is to undermine
system’s confidentiality, intergrity or availability.
At the present time, there are quite no hardware specific malwares, even if
some operating system are themselves hardware dependent (e.g. Symbian mal-
wares). Recently, GPGPU malware [IPV10] have been proposed but they just
exploit the fact that graphic cards are just distinct devices with quite the same
features and capability as the system they are connected to. They do not really
condition their action on new computing features. GPGPU malware strongly
depend on the graphic card type (CUDA or OpenCL enabled).
We propose here to investigate the following critical issue: is it possible to
design malware – or more generally, any program – that operate beyond operating
system and application types and varieties? More precisely, we want:
⋆ The present paper is the extended version of the work presented at the iAWACS’09.
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– going beyond operating system and application types/varieties . . . ;
– while exploiting hardware specificities.
If such an approach is possible, this would:
– enable far more precise and targeted attacks, at a finer level (surgical strikes)
in a large network of heterogeneous machines but with generic malware;
– and represent a significant advantage in a context of cyberwarfare.
The recent case of theStuxNet worm shows that targeted attacks towards PLC
components are nowadays a major concern in cyberattacks. However, while it
can be very difficult to forecast and envisage which kind of applications is likely
to be present on the target system (it can be a secret information), the variety
in terms of hardware – and especially as far as processors are concerned – is
far more reduced due to the very limited number of hardware manufacturers.
We propose to consider processor-dependent malware and to rely on the onboard
processor, which seems a good candidate to design hardware dependent software
(a malware is indeed a software).
To design such dependent processor malware, we need to identify the proces-
sor as precisely as possible. This is possible thanks to a different ways:
– by reversing existing binaries (but this provides a limited information since
a given binary can indifferently execute on several processors like Intel x86s
or AMDs chips),
– classical intelligence gathering...
There is a large spectrum of possibilities to collect this technical intelligence.
But there is a bad news: deriving knowledge about processor internals is tricky
and require a lot of work. Instead of analyzing processor logic gates architecture,
we propose to work at the higher level: to exploit mathematical perfection versus
processor reality.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the theoretical back-
ground which make hardware-dependent malware possible. Then Section 3 ex-
poses how to exploit processors’ mathematical limitations in order to make pro-
grams’ execution vary according to the processor in place. Section 4 then gives
implementation and experimental results before concluding and presenting fu-
ture work in Section 5.
2 Theoretical Background
2.1 Starting From a Formal Model of Malware - Notation
We consider the formal model given by Zuo and Zhou in 2004 [ZZ04], Zuo, Zhou
and Zhu in 2005 [ZZZ05] and Filiol in 2004 [Fil05].
– Sets N and S are the set of natural integers and the set of all finite sequences
of such integers, respectively.
– Let s1, s2, . . . , sn be elements from S.
• Let < s1, s2, . . . , sn > describe an injective computable function from
Sn to N whose inverse function is computable as well.
• If we consider a partial computable function f : N→ N, then f(s1, s2, . . . , sn)
describes f(< s1, s2, . . . , sn >) in an abridged way.
• This notation extends to any n-tuple of integers i1, i2, . . . , in.
– For a given sequence p = (i1, i2, . . . , ik, . . . , in) ∈ S, we denote p[jk/ik] the
sequence p in which the term ik has been replaced by jk, let say p[jk/ik] =
(i1, i2, . . . , jk, . . . , in).
– If the element ik of sequence p is computed by a computable function v
(equivalently compute p[v(ik)/ik]), let us adopt the equivalent abridged no-
tation p[v(ik)] in which the underlined symbol describes the computed ele-
ment.
– In the general case (compute more than one element at the same time in p),
we note p[v1(ik1), v2(ik2), . . . , vl(ikl)].
Now that everything to model programs has been given, let us define things
at a higher level formally: program, data and operating system.
– We describe by φP (d, p) a function which is computed by a program P in
the environment (d, p).
• d and p are denoting data in the environment (including clock, mass
memories and equivalent structures or devices) and programs (including
those of the operating system itself) respectively.
• That environment corresponds in fact to the operating system which has
been extended to the activity of one or more users.
– When considering the Go¨del coding e for the program P , we use the notation
φe(d, p). Its definition domain is then denoted by We while his image space
is denoted Ee.
2.2 Exploring the Viral Classes
Let us give the general formal definition of computer viruses (most complete case)
with the following definition. However this definition can be extended to any
other kind (non self-reproducing) malware and more generally to any program,
eventually by dropping the self-reproduction properties off.
Definition 1 (Non Resident Virus) A total recursive function v is a non resi-
dent virus if for every program i, we have:
1. φv(i)(d, p) =


D(d, p), if T (d, p) (i) (Added Fonctionnality)
φi(d, p[v(S(p))]) if I(d, p) (ii) (Infection)
φi(d, p), otherwise (iii) (Imitation)
2. T (d, p) and I(d, p) are two recursive predicates such that there is no value
< d, p > that satisfies them both at the same time. Moreover both functions
D(d, p) et S(p) are recursive.
3. The set {< d, p >: ¬(T (d, p) ∨ I(d, p))} is infinite.
The two predicates T (d, p) and I(d, p) represent the payload and the infection
trigger conditions respectively. Whenever T (d, p) is true, the virus executes the
payload D(d, p) while whenever I(d, p) is true, the virus selects a target program
by means of the selection function S(p) and then infects it. Finally the original
program i is executed (host program). For a virus kernel: the set of functions
D(d, p) and S(p) with predicates T (d, p) and I(d, p): the virus kernel describes
the malware in a univoqual way. This model can be extended to other form of
malware (more sophisticated viruses, Trojan. . . ).
Polymorphic and Metamorphic Viruses
Definition 2 The pair (v, v′) of total recursive functions v and v′ is called Poly-
morphic virus with two forms if for every program i we have
φv(i)(d, p) =


D(d, p), if T (d, p)
φi(d, p[v
′(S(p))]), if I(d, p)
φi(d, p), otherwise
and
φv′(i)(d, p) =


D(d, p), if T (d, p)
φi(d, p[v(S(p))]), if I(d, p)
φi(d, p), otherwise
Whenever predicate I(d, p) is true the virus selects a target program by means
of S(p), infects it then transfers control back to the host program x. S(p) is
performing the code mutation as well.
Definition 3 Let v and v′ be two different total recursive functions. The pair
(v, v′) is called metamorphic virus if for every program i, then the pair (v, v′)
satisfies:
φv(i)(d, p) =


D(d, p), if T (d, p)
φi(d, p[v
′(S(p))]), if I(d, p)
φi(d, p), otherwise
et
φv′(i)(d, p) =


D′(d, p), if T ′(d, p)
φi(d, p[v(S(p))]), if I
′(d, p)
φi(d, p), otherwise
where T (d, p) – respectively I(d, p), D(d, p), S(p) – is different from T ′(d, p) –
respectively I ′(d, p), D′(d, p), S′(p).
Metamorphic viruses are similar to polymorhic viruses except that selection
functions S(p) and S′(p) are different. The kernel of metamorphic forms are
totally different.
Stealth Viruses
Definition 4 The pair (v, sys) made of a total recursive function v and a system
call sys (a recursive function as well) is a stealth virus with respect to the system
call sys, if there exists a recursive function h such that for every program i we
have:
φv(i)(d, p) =


D(d, p), if T (d, p)
φi(d, p[v(S(p)), h(sys)]) si I(d, p)
φi(d, p), otherwise
et
φh(sys)(i) =
{
φsys(y), if x = v(y)
φsys(i), otherwise
Let us point out that stealth is a relative concept (with respect to a given set of
system calls).
2.3 Practical Utility of the Formal Model: What Does the Model
Show Us
We must identify and use a feature that will make a virus (in the general case,
a malware) operate whether a given type of processor chip is present or not. In
the previous formal definition, whatever may be the class of virus, the obvious
candidates for usable features are predicates T (d, p) and I(d, p) (payload and
infection trigger conditions respectively). In the optimal case, we are interested
in considering two different features to control and manage payload triggering
and infection control separately and independently. So:
– Code mutation and stealth can also be managed with respect to specific
processors in the same way.
• As an example a malware will enforce Hardware Virtual Machine-based
rootkit techniques whenever present.
• Code mutation (e.g metamorphism) will be activated only if a suitable
processor instruction set is available.
– This approach, yet formal, gives a powerful insight of how design processor-
dependent malware.
– This enables to reduce the problem of side effects significantly, that may
betray the activity of a malware.
3 Exploiting Mathematical Processor Limitations
In order to use processor to discriminate programs’ action and execution, we
are going to exploit the fact that first there is a huge difference between the
mathematical reality and their implementation in computing systems and second
that that difference is managed in various ways according to the processor brand,
model and type.
3.1 Mathematical perfection versus Processor Reality
Let us begin with a very classical example: the algorithm given in Table 1. We
can ask: what does this code (really) compute?
Algorithm 1 : The √ problem
Input: — a real A;
Output: — a boolean B
Begin:
B =
√
A ∗
√
A;
Return[A==B];
End.
Table 1. The Square-root problem
Well, let us suppose we chooseA = 2.0 as input for this Square-root algorithm,
we then have two possible answers, that are quite opposite:
1. Mathematically: True is returned;
2. Practically: False is returned!
Let us now explain why we have this different output. This come from the fact
that processors:
– have an increasing (architecture) complexity and size,
– have bugs, known and unknown (not published),
– use floating point arithmetic,
– use generally “secret” algorithms for usual arithmetic functions like 1/x,
√
x,
1/
√
x . . . that can be computed:
1. at the hardware level;
2. and/or at the software level.
As an example of a “secret algorithm”, let us cite the famous Pentium Bugs
case in 1994: Intel has never published neither the correct algorithm nor its
bugged version used for the division but some researchers have tried reverse
engineering techniques to understand which algorithm was programmed actually
(for instance, the reader will refer to the (beautiful) paper [CMMP95]).
Let us now consider the following problem: can we define a set of (simple)
tests to know on which processor we are? As a practical example: is it possible
to know whether we are on a mobile phone or on a computer?
The Intel Assembly Language instruction CPUID can be used both on Intel
and AMD processors, but it has at least two severe drawbacks:
– it is easy to “find” it whenever scanning the file (malware detection issue);
– some other processors cannot recognize and process this instruction.
3.2 Processor Bugs
Known or unknown bugs are good candidates to design such a set of tests and
hence to discriminate processors:
– as an instance of such bug/test, it is easy determine whether we use a 1994
bugged Pentium or not: just use the numerical value that makes appear the
Pentium Division Bug;
– but a lot of bugs will freeze the computer only (this can be used for processor-
dependent denial of service [DoS] however);
– and it is not so simple to find a list of bugs, even if there are supposed to be
“known”.
So in this paper, we will not use bugs unless they involve a floating point arith-
metic operator. However it is worth keeping in mind that the knowledge of some
bugs (by the manufacturer, a Nation State...) can be efficiently used to target
processors specifically and hence it represents a critical knowledge not to say
a strategic one. Worse, hiding such bugs or managing floating arithmetics in a
very specific way is more than interesting.
More generally let us consider some differences that exist event within the
same type of processors but produced in two different versions: a national and
an “export” version. As an example, we can consider the popcount function
which compute the Hamming weight of an integer (the number of 1s in its binary
form). Since it is a critical function in the context of cryptanalysis, the national
version of a few processors have this function implemented in hardware while
the export version just emulate it at the software level. Consequently a good
way to discriminate national version from export version consists in computing
Hamming weight a large number of times and then to record the computation
time: it will be significantly higher for the export version which hence can be
specifically targeted by a malware attack.
3.3 Using Floatinf Point Arithmetics: The IEEE P754 Standard
The IEEE P754 standard [Ove01] has been approved as a norm by IEEE ANSI
in 1985. A lot of processors follow and comply to it but some processors do not.
As an example, let us mention the CRAY 1 or DEC VAX 780. Moreover, not all
microcontrollers follow this standard either.
This norm does not impose the algorithms to compute usual functions lke
1/x,
√
x, 1/
√
x or ex. It just gives a specification for the four basic operations: ad-
dition, substraction, multiplication and division. So, for all other functions, there
is very likely to exist differences as far as their implementation as algorithms are
concerned. But we have to find them!
For 32-bit, environments, we have (see Table 2):
– 1 bit for the sign;
– 23 bits for the mantissa;
– 8 bits for the exponent (integer).
sign(x) mantissa(x) exponent(x)
1 bit 23 bits 8 bits
Table 2. Structure of 32-bit float “numbers” in the IEEE P754 Standard
The floating point arithmetic has a lot of curiosities, let us see some of them.
One can find in [DM97,KM83] the following questions due to Rump:
– Evaluate the expression
F (X, Y ) =
(1682XY 4 + 3X3 + 29XY 2 − 2X5 + 832)
107751
with X = 192119201 and Y = 35675640. The “exact” result is 1783 but
numerically we can have a very different value like −7.18056 1020 (on a 32-
bit IEEE P754 compliant processor).
– Evaluate the expression
P (X) = 8118X4 − 11482X3 +X2 + 5741X − 2030
with X = 1/
√
2 and X = 0.707. The “exact” result is 0 but numerically we
can have a very different value like −2.74822 10−8 (on a 32-bit IEEE P754
compliant processor).
Let us recall that the numerical value of an algebraic expression depends (gen-
erally) on the compiler because a non basic numerical expression result depends
strongly on the order of the intermediate computations.
4 Implementation and Experimental Results
Now we have defined and illustrated the core principle of our approach, let us
consider a few implementations we have considered as well as the corresponding
results.
4.1 The Gentleman Code or How to Compute the Word Length
If we want to know on which processor we are working, we need to find, before
anything else, two critical information:
1. the first thing is to find the base value used to represent numbers;
2. the second is the word length, i.e. the number of bits the processor is used
to work (with floating point numbers for example).
For the base value, it is easy to conjecture that the base is 2, at least for modern
processors. As far as the the word length is concerned, we have not found any
numerical algorithm that is able to answer this question but we have found
something very close. The algorithm given in Table 3 called the Gentleman
Code [GM74,Mul89] is surprisingly very interesting for both problems. First we
can again ask: what does this code (really) compute? Well, again, we have two
possible answers:
Algorithm 2 : The Gentleman Code
Input: — A=1.0 ; B=1.0;
Output: — A,B
Begin:
A=1.0;
B=1.0;
While ((A+1.0)-A)-1.0==0 ;
A=2*A;
While ((A+B)-A)-B==0 ;
B=B+1.0;
Return[A,B];
End.
Table 3. The Gentleman code
1. Mathematically: the two loops are theoretically infinite loops so they are
looping forever;
2. Practically (see [Mul89]):
– log2(A) gives the number of bits used by the mantissa of floating point
numbers;
– B is the base used by the floating point arithmetic of the environment
(generally it is equal to 2).
Both values are of course processor-dependent constants. So, with a small pro-
gram, which has a polynomial time complexity, we can compute the number of
bits used to represent the mantissa of any floating point number and so, we can
deduce the word length.
4.2 Some Basic (but Yet Too) Simple Tests
Let us give a first list of tests we have tried (Table 4). So these tests are inter-
esting but not completely useful, this shows that we can simply know whether
the processor follows the IEEE P754 arithmetic norm or not. For these sim-
ple expression, all processors that are IEEE P754 compliant will give the same
answers. Hence, this is not enough.
4.3 Some Less Basic Tests
With the following constant definitions in our test program in C, we obtain the
results given in Tables 5 and 6.
– #define Pi1 3.141592653
– #define Pi2 3.141592653589
– #define Pi3 3.141592653589793
Processor Tests
1.2-0.8 == 0.4 0.1+0.1 == 0.2 0.1+0.1+0.1 == 0.3 0.1+. . . 0.1 == 1.0
VAX 750 Yes Yes No No
AMD 32 No Yes No No
AMD 64 No Yes No No
ATOM No Yes No No
INTEL DC No Yes No No
MIPS 12000 No Yes No No
dsPIC33FJ21 No Yes Yes No
IPHONE 3G No Yes No No
Table 4. A few easy computations
– #define Pi4 3.1415926535897932385
These results are more interesting, especially those in the third column (the
numerical computation of sin(1037pi1)) in Table 5: a simple computation gives
four subclasses of the set of processors (emphasized by a double horizontal lign
between the subclasses).
Processor sin(1010pi1) sin(10
17pi1) sin(10
37pi1) sin(10
17pi1) == sin(10
17pi2)
IPHONE 3G 0.375... 0.423... -0.837... No
AMD 32 0.375... 0.424... -0.837... No
AMD 64 0.375.. 0.424.. 0.837... No
ATOM 0.375.. 0.423.. -0.832.. No
INTEL DC 0.375... 0.423... -0.832... No
MIPS 12000 0.375... 0.423... -0.832... No
dsPIC33 0.81... 0.62... -0.44... Yes
Table 5. Computation of sin(1010pi) for various numerical values of the constant pi
Processor sin(1037pi1) sin(10
37pi2) sin(10
37pi3) sin(10
37pi4)
IPHONE 3G 47257756 9d94ef4d 99f9067 99f9067
AMD 64 af545000 af545000 af545000 af545000
ATOM 47257756 9d94ef4d 99f9067 99f9067
INTEL DC 47257756 9d94ef4d 99f9067 99f9067
MIPS 12000 47257756 9d94ef4d 99f9067 99f9067
dsPIC33 bee5 bee5 bee5 bee5
Table 6. sin(1037pi) in hex for various numerical values of the constant pi
4.4 Do Not Forget the Influence of the Compiler
Let us give a last example. We want to compute the generalized sum
s(N) :=
N∑
i=1
10N (1)
The “exact” value is of course N ∗ 10N , but let us have a look at the Table 7
to see some values we can have when computing s(N)−N ∗ 10N . However we
N 10 21 22 25 30 100
s−N ∗ 10N 0.0 0.0 −8.05 108 −6.71 107 −4.50 1015 4.97 1086
Table 7. Computation of s(N)−∑N
i=1
10N for different values of N
have to point out that the results of the Table 7) heavily depend of course of
the processor but also of the compiler used, of the options used and so on . . .
More work has to be done to better understand these aspects. Nonetheless,
we have here new insights on how design more specific attacks when considering
the processor type AND the compiler version/type as the same time.
5 Conclusion and Future Work: Two interesting Open
Problems
Floating Point Arithmetic (FPA) looks promising to define a set of tests enabling
to identify the processor or, more precisely, a subset of possible processors. We
intend to propose very soon the Proc Scope Tool: a sotfware tool. Proc Scope
uses carefully chosen numerical expressions that give information on the proces-
sor type.
More results will be published very soon. We propose now two open problems
that, to the authors’ knowledge, are new.
The first open problem we propose is the one discussed in this work: can
we find an numerical algorithm, with a linear complexity in time and space and
compute a floating point expression, that can help to distinguish a given processor
precisely? Beyond the examples we have proposed here, a promising algorithm
could be based on a variant of the famous logistic equation, thoroughly studied
in the chaos theory, which is defined by:
xn+1 = r xn (1− xn) (2)
with r ∈ [0, 4].
The sequence defined by Equation 2, for a chosen and fixed x0, can exhibit
very different behaviors:
– a periodic behavior for example for values of r less than 3.0;
– or a chaotic behavior for values of r slightly larger than 3.57.
See [ASY96,Bar88,Dev86,PJS92] for a detailed study of the properties of these
sequences.
Finally, we propose another new problem: find processor-dependent hash func-
tions. Generally, hash functions are defined as independent from the processor.
But, in some cases, one can desire to get rid of this view. We propose in fact to
take the opposite idea: we want a hash function that heavily depends of the pro-
cessor used to compute it. For example, it can be interesting to design a specific
hash function for a smartphone or a specific processor. The best way to design
such a hash function seems to use the properties of the floating point arithmetic
operators of the processor; more specifically some of the arithmetic functions
implemented on the processor. The second open problem we propose is then:
can we define, for a specific processor, hash functions that use the floating point
arithmetic of the concerned processor that respect the classical requirements for
such functions?
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